The Real Iraq We Knew

By 12 former Army captains
Washington Post October 16, 2007

Today marks five years since the authorization of military force in
Iraq, setting Operation Iraqi Freedom in motion. Five years on, the
Iraq war is as undermanned and under-resourced as it was from the
start. And, five years on, Iraq is in shambles.

As Army captains who served in Baghdad and beyond, we’ve seen the
corruption and the sectarian division. We understand what it’s like to
be stretched too thin. And we know when it’s time to get out.

What does Iraq look like on the ground? It’s certainly far from being
a modern, self-sustaining country. Many roads, bridges, schools and
hospitals are in deplorable condition. Fewer people have access to
drinking water or sewage systems than before the war. And Baghdad is
averaging less than eight hours of electricity a day.

Iraq’s institutional infrastructure, too, is sorely wanting. Even if
the Iraqis wanted to work together and accept the national identity
foisted upon them in 1920s, the ministries do not have enough trained
administrators or technicians to coordinate themselves. At the local
level, most communities are still controlled by the same autocratic
sheiks that ruled under Saddam. There is no reliable postal system. No
effective banking system. No registration system to monitor the
population and its needs.

The inability to govern is exacerbated at all levels by widespread
corruption. Transparency International ranks Iraq as one of the most
corrupt countries in the world. And, indeed, many of us witnessed the
exploitation of U.S. tax dollars by Iraqi officials and military
officers. Sabotage and graft have had a particularly deleterious
impact on Iraq’s oil industry, which still fails to produce the
revenue that Pentagon war planners hoped would pay for Iraq’s
reconstruction. Yet holding people accountable has proved difficult.
The first commissioner of a panel charged with preventing and
investigating corruption resigned last month, citing pressure from the
government and threats on his life.

Against this backdrop, the U.S. military has been trying in vain to
hold the country together. Even with “the surge,” we simply do not
have enough soldiers and marines to meet the professed goals of
clearing areas from insurgent control, holding them securely and
building sustainable institutions. Though temporary reinforcing
operations in places like Fallujah, An Najaf, Tal Afar, and now
Baghdad may brief well on PowerPoint presentations, in practice they
just push insurgents to another spot on the map and often strengthen
the insurgents’ cause by harassing locals to a point of swayed
allegiances. Millions of Iraqis correctly recognize these actions for
what they are and vote with their feet — moving within Iraq or
leaving the country entirely. Still, our colonels and generals keep
holding on to flawed concepts.

U.S. forces, responsible for too many objectives and too much “battle
space,” are vulnerable targets. The sad inevitability of a protracted
draw-down is further escalation of attacks — on U.S. troops, civilian
leaders and advisory teams. They would also no doubt get caught in the
crossfire of the imminent Iraqi civil war.

Iraqi security forces would not be able to salvage the situation. Even
if all the Iraqi military and police were properly trained, equipped
and truly committed, their 346,000 personnel would be too few. As it
is, Iraqi soldiers quit at will. The police are effectively controlled
by militias. And, again, corruption is debilitating. U.S. tax dollars
enrich self-serving generals and support the very elements that will
battle each other after we’re gone.

This is Operation Iraqi Freedom and the reality we experienced. This
is what we tried to communicate up the chain of command. This is
either what did not get passed on to our civilian leadership or what
our civilian leaders chose to ignore. While our generals pursue a
strategy dependent on peace breaking out, the Iraqis prepare for their
war — and our servicemen and women, and their families, continue to
suffer.

There is one way we might be able to succeed in Iraq. To continue an
operation of this intensity and duration, we would have to abandon our
volunteer military for compulsory service. Short of that, our best
option is to leave Iraq immediately. A scaled withdrawal will not
prevent a civil war, and it will spend more blood and treasure on a
losing proposition.

America, it has been five years. It’s time to make a choice.

This column was written by 12 former Army captains: Jason Blindauer
served in Babil and Baghdad in 2003 and 2005. Elizabeth Bostwick
served in Salah Ad Din and An Najaf in 2004. Jeffrey Bouldin served in
Al Anbar, Baghdad and Ninevah in 2006. Jason Bugajski served in Diyala
in 2004. Anton Kemps served in Babil and Baghdad in 2003 and 2005.
Kristy (Luken) McCormick served in Ninevah in 2003. Luis Carlos
Montalván served in Anbar, Baghdad and Nineveh in 2003 and 2005.
William Murphy served in Babil and Baghdad in 2003 and 2005. Josh
Rizzo served in Baghdad in 2006. William “Jamie” Ruehl served in
Nineveh in 2004. Gregg Tharp served in Babil and Baghdad in 2003 and
2005. Gary Williams served in Baghdad in 2003.

© 2007 Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive